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Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill:
A Response to Professor Dressler
Joan H. Krause*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections,1 Professor
Joshua Dressler offers cogent criticism of the application of self-defense to
battered women who kill their abusers under “nonconfrontational” circumstances,
such as when the abuser is asleep. Dressler is critical of using evidence that the
defendant suffered from “Battered Woman Syndrome” (“BWS”) to establish the
requisite defense elements, which historically have applied only in confrontational
contexts. According to Dressler’s critique, legislators, judges, and academics have
far too easily accepted the proposition that the battered woman’s actions are
morally justifiable, and have been far too willing to stretch the limits of the
doctrine to accomplish this end. Dressler asserts that “[t]he proposition that a
battered woman is justified in killing her sleeping abuser, although well-meaning,
is wrong, and . . . any serious effort to expand self-defense law . . . to permit such
killings [risks] . . . the coarsening of our moral values about human life and,
perhaps, even the condonation of homicidal vengeance.”2 In place of self-defense,
Dressler proposes an expanded use of the duress doctrine to excuse rather than
justify the battered woman’s actions, permitting society to condemn the killing
while simultaneously acknowledging that the defendant lacked a “fair opportunity
to conform her conduct to the dictates of the law.”3
Although not explicitly stated, Dressler’s criticism appears to rest on three
core assumptions: one moral, one factual, and one practical. For Dressler, the
underlying moral basis of self-defense is “the basic common law message that the
taking of life should be an act of last resort.”4 In accordance with this principle,
*
George Butler Research Professor of Law and Co-Director, Health Law & Policy Institute,
University of Houston Law Center. I am grateful to Professor Joshua Dressler for his inspiring
criminal law scholarship, and for his good humor in tolerating my criticism. My thanks to Leslie
Griffin, Ellen Marrus, Gerry Moohr, Laura Oren, Nancy Rapoport, Irene Rosenberg, Richard Saver,
and Sandra Guerra Thompson for their suggestions regarding this Commentary, and to Librarian
Peter Egler for his assistance. For my earlier thoughts on some of these issues, see Joan H. Krause,
Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46
FLA. L. REV. 699 (1994).
1
Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 457 (2006).
2
Id. at 458.
3
Id. at 469.
4
Id. at 471.
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the use of deadly force in self-defense is permissible only when the actor
reasonably believes it is necessary to protect herself from an imminent, unlawful,
deadly attack.5 Dressler’s second assumption is that, as a factual matter, a battered
woman who kills her abuser under nonconfrontational circumstances will never be
able to establish that she faced such an objectively imminent threat. From this, it
follows that any attempt to characterize a battered woman’s nonconfrontational
killing as justifiable can succeed only by, in essence, making a mockery of the
doctrine’s moral underpinnings. Finally, in positing that the excuse of duress is a
better fit for such defendants, Dressler assumes as a practical matter that jurors will
be competent to assess whether or not a battered woman acted as a “person of
reasonable firmness” would have acted under the circumstances, without the need
for expert testimony. The goal of this Commentary is to demonstrate that each of
these core assumptions is flawed in an important way.6
As an initial matter, it is useful to understand just how rarely this issue arises.
In reality, few battered women kill their abusers, and fewer still do so in
nonconfrontational situations. While it is difficult to identify all such homicides, a
comprehensive study of appellate cases from 1902 to 1991 in which female
defendants claimed to have killed their abusive domestic partners in self-defense
estimated that 20% of such killings (roughly 45 cases) were nonconfrontational,
with 8% (roughly 18 cases) involving sleeping victims.7 These figures are roughly
consistent with a more recent study of self-defense cases between 1979 and 1999
in which imminence was at issue, which found that approximately 9% of such
killings were committed by battered women in nonconfrontational settings.8 While
Dressler suggests that these numbers may be underinclusive,9 the available
research indicates that most battered women who kill do so in the midst of a
confrontation.
With regard to Dressler’s first assumption regarding the moral basis of selfdefense, while the preservation of life is indeed one of the foundations of the
doctrine, there are competing philosophical theories that accord the abuser’s
interests significantly less weight than those of his victim. In terms of Dressler’s
core factual assumption, the assessment of whether a sleeping abuser constitutes an
5

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.01[B], at 237 (4th ed. 2006).
In a previous conversation, Professor Dressler characterized himself as “a pacifist who
trusts the jury system.” Unfortunately, I’m not and I don’t. To the extent our disagreements are
purely normative, then, we may find little common ground.
7
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 394–97 (1991). Maguigan identified 223 cases meeting
her criteria, generating 270 opinions.
8
V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1249, 1253 (2001).
9
See Dressler, supra note 1, at 457 n.1 (noting that Maguigan’s study did not take into
account acquittals, guilty pleas, pre-trial dismissals, or killings that were not prosecuted). Moreover,
in some unsolved nonconfrontational cases the perpetrator may in fact have been the decedent’s
battered wife or girlfriend.
6
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objectively imminent threat is confounded by imprecise definitions of the concept
of imminence, by a reasonable person standard that is significantly less objective
than it appears, and by confusion over the nature of the threat the battered woman
is asked to predict. Finally, as for Dressler’s faith that the jury will be able to
resolve these issues without the help of expert testimony, the end result may be
merely to refocus the jury on an issue that should be irrelevant to the inquiry: why
didn’t the battered woman extricate herself from the relationship long before this
point? My position, ultimately, is that all the moral risks supposedly presented by
battered women who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances are, instead, dangers
inherent in the doctrine of self-defense. We may decry these dangers or we may
embrace them, but it is both incorrect and unfair to hold battered women to a
higher standard than the doctrine requires.10
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN
To understand why battered women who kill their abusers have generated so
much attention, one must first understand the basic contours of self-defense. Selfdefense developed as a legal doctrine that, in limited circumstances, would render
an otherwise criminal act of violence acceptable.
Under the traditional
formulation, an actor may defend herself with deadly force only when she
reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend against an imminent (or in
some jurisdictions an “immediate”) unlawful threat of death or serious bodily
harm.11 This belief must be both subjectively reasonable, in that the actor herself
truly believes it, and objectively reasonable, in that a reasonable person would
similarly so believe. Self-defense generally is characterized as a justification,
although there is some evidence that the defense originally functioned, at least in
part, as an excuse at English common law.12 The distinction is not merely
semantic: if the defense is viewed as an excuse, we focus on a particular actor’s
lack of moral culpability for what is acknowledged to be an improper killing. In
contrast, construing the defense as a justification means that despite the legal
prohibition against homicide, in this situation the killing “was right, or at least not
wrong” 13—not just for this defendant, but for all those in similar circumstances.
The choice of defensive theory also has implications for mistakes: while a
reasonable error about the nature of the threatened harm may be justifiable, an

10
As Professor Victoria Nourse has argued, “it is time to stop blaming the downfall of the
criminal law on subjectivity and the battered woman; she has not created new problems, but simply
reminded us of the importance of resolving old controversies.” Nourse, supra note 8, at 1294–95.
11
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.04, at 539, 540–41, 544–46 (4th ed. 2003).
12
See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on
Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 26 (1986).
13
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 16.03, at 218–19.
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unreasonable error is not, and thus can only excuse the actor (generally by
reducing the charge to manslaughter).14
For a battered woman who kills in nonconfrontational circumstances, the
chief obstacles to proving self-defense are the requirements that she reasonably
believe the threatened harm to be imminent, as the killing occurs in the absence of
any ongoing physical attack. As discussed below, at least on a theoretical level
these barriers may not be insurmountable. Practically, however, these challenges
were the genesis of efforts to introduce expert testimony regarding BWS. After
years of working with battered women, Dr. Lenore Walker identified key elements
of a syndrome that helps to explain how a woman might become trapped in an
abusive relationship, and why killing her abuser might seem a reasonable course of
action. Walker described a three-stage escalating “cycle of violence” consisting
of: (1) a “tension-building” stage, in which the woman suffers minor verbal or
physical abuse and tries to prevent escalation; (2) the “acute battering incident”;
and (3) “loving-contrition or absence of tension,” a relatively peaceful stage
marked by the abuser’s remorse and the battered woman’s hope that the cycle will
finally end.15 To explain why a woman who has experienced this cycle remains in
the relationship, Walker posited that battered women suffer from “learned
helplessness,” as a result of which “it becomes extraordinarily difficult for such
women to change their cognitive set to believe their competent actions can change
their life situation.”16 Over time, the periods of respite become shorter and the
stages of tension and violence escalate—until, for some women, it becomes quite
literally “kill or be killed.”
As discussed below, Walker’s research has been extensively criticized for its
methodological, cultural, and normative shortcomings. Assuming for the moment
that BWS paints an accurate picture of at least some battered women, however,
how is it relevant to self-defense? At trial, expert evidence concerning BWS is
offered to help judges and jurors understand how the woman’s actions are
reasonable (and hence justifiable) under the circumstances. Dressler acknowledges
that such evidence is relevant to two basic questions: why the defendant remained
in the abusive relationship over time, and (less clearly) whether she herself truly
believed that a sleeping or otherwise incapacitated abuser presented an imminent
threat.17 Most controversially, this evidence has been used to explain how the
14

Id. § 18.03, at 249.
Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 531–
32 (1978).
16
Id. at 529. Walker adapted the theory of learned helplessness from the work of Dr. Martin
Seligman, who found that laboratory animals subjected to random electrical shocks continued to
behave passively even when later given an opportunity to avoid additional shocks. Id. at 526. See
generally MARTIN E. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975).
17
Dressler, supra note 1, at 463. Note that the testimony’s relevance to the first point, why
the woman remained in the relationship, is something of a red herring in self-defense cases, as the
defense does not impose a general duty on individuals to avoid potentially violent situations. See
Nourse, supra note 8, at 1284–85 (criticizing such a “pre-retreat” requirement).
15
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defendant’s actions satisfy the objective aspect of the reasonableness inquiry, a
task made easier if she can be compared to a “reasonable battered woman” rather
than the generic “reasonable person.”18 It is this third use of BWS evidence that
most offends Dressler, and to which I now turn.
III. IMMINENCE AND THE OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE PERSON
If self-defense requires the actor’s reasonable belief in the existence of an
imminent threat, the definitions of those terms become crucial. “Imminence” has
been defined as requiring the attack “to be almost immediately forthcoming.”19 In
other words, we think of imminence as encompassing a traditional confrontation,
where the actor responds almost instantaneously to a threatened attack. An
unprovoked knife fight, an armed home intruder, a mugger demanding money at
gun-point on a darkened street corner—these we consider imminent threats. When
the purported assailant is asleep, however, it would appear this standard cannot be
met. Yet even at common law, the fact that an actor misperceives the immediacy
of the threat may not be fatal to a claim of self-defense. As noted above, the
doctrine encompasses reasonable errors about imminence; it is only where the
error is unreasonable that the defense is unavailable, and the actor must instead try
to mitigate the severity of her crime through an imperfect self-defense excuse.
The concept of a “reasonable” belief in imminent harm forms the crux of
Dressler’s criticism of the battered woman’s defensive claim. Dressler shapes his
argument by using the facts of State v. Norman, a North Carolina case in which a
woman who killed her long-time abuser while he slept raised a claim of selfdefense.20 After quoting the horrific facts of the case—which included more than
20 years of physical abuse during which J.T. Norman forced his wife into
prostitution to support the family, the fact that the violence escalated so much in
the days prior to the killing that Judy Norman attempted suicide, and the fact that
the police were called at least twice in the final 24 hours—Dressler concludes that,
at the moment of his death, “[t]here is simply no basis for suggesting that J.T.
18

At least one court has adopted a highly subjective approach to reasonableness in a
nonconfrontational battered woman case. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983)
(holding that defendant’s “actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a person whose mental and
physical characteristics are like the accused’s and who sees what the accused sees and knows what
the accused knows.”).
19
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 10.04(d), at 544. See also Dressler, supra note 1, at 461
(defining imminence to mean “that the attack will occur momentarily, that it is just about
underway.”). Some jurisdictions, as well as the Model Penal Code, have broadened the formulation
slightly to encompass “immediately necessary” killings. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1)(1985). Even
a broader formulation, however, requires the threat to occur in the present situation; it does not open
the time frame to encompass temporally remote past or future threats.
20
Dressler, supra note 1, at 459–61 (quoting State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988)). It is important to note—as Dressler does not—that Judy Norman ultimately lost her appeal.
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
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Norman in reality represented an imminent threat to Judy Norman, as traditional
law defines ‘imminence.’”21 Having rejected any possibility that her belief might
have been accurate, Dressler then goes further: “It is hard to believe that she
subjectively could believe this. Indeed, if Judy Norman did believe, because of
BWS, that her sleeping husband represented an instantaneous threat . . . [i]t should
suggest that there was something wrong with Judy Norman’s psychological
connection to reality.”22 Thus, not only does Dressler deny any possibility that
Judy Norman confronted an objectively imminent threat, he asserts that only a
mentally incapacitated person could even subjectively believe such a threat
existed—and in the criminal law, compassion for those suffering from
psychological infirmities is the province of excuse, not justification. However,
there are good reasons to question both the factual and philosophical bases for
Dressler’s argument.
A. Imminence
Despite the long pedigree of self-defense, a surprising amount of confusion
surrounds the key concept of “imminence.” As a preliminary matter, it is unclear
whether imminence functions primarily as an empirical standard or as a normative
one. The quoted definitions certainly suggest an empirical temporal question: we
should simply look to the amount of time that elapsed between the decedent’s
threat and the defendant’s response. Ongoing confrontations should suffice, while
attacks on incapacitated (albeit previously violent) individuals should not. Yet
case law suggests that this is not, in fact, how the concept of imminence often
plays out.
The best research to date comes from a detailed study by Professor Victoria
Nourse, who examined “imminence-relevant” trial and appellate opinions between
1979 and 1999.23 Contrary to the conventional assumption that imminence is a
legal barrier to self-defense only when there is a significant time lag between threat
and response, Nourse found that the vast majority of cases in which imminence
was at issue—both in general (84%) and for battered women in particular (70%)—
involved facts that fit the model of a confrontation.24 Nourse concluded that
imminence was often used by judges as a proxy for other concepts relevant to
culpability, such as the severity and probability of the threat, the possibility that the
actor could have avoided the killing by retreating, the actor’s fear of (rather than
21

Dressler, supra note 1, at 463–64.
Id. at 464. Dressler has made this point even more forcefully elsewhere, characterizing
such defendants as “unable to appreciate objective reality.” DRESSLER, supra note 5, at § 18.05[b][4],
at 263.
23
See Nourse, supra note 8, at 1249, 1252–55.
24
Although cases involving battered women did constitute a higher percentage of
nonconfrontational cases, nearly 40% of nonconfrontational cases involved male defendants. Id. at
1254.
22
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malice toward) the decedent, and whether the decedent was the original aggressor.
At first blush these results may be surprising, not only because they challenge the
conventional wisdom regarding how imminence frames self-defense, but also
because they raise the possibility that a supposedly temporal standard is
determined instead by a host of non-empirical normative factors, some explicitly
irrelevant to the legal inquiry. Perhaps the prime example concerns retreat: in a
jurisdiction that does not require the actor to retreat before responding with deadly
force, using imminence as a proxy for retreat would have the effect of imposing
that legal requirement through a back door.25
On second thought, however, perhaps the use of imminence as a proxy for
other culpability factors is not unexpected. Indeed, for many commentators, “[t]he
rationale underlying the imminence requirement is to ensure that the defendant’s
use of defensive force was necessary.”26 Of course, this raises another question:
necessary for what? To this, Dressler has a ready answer: imminence functions to
limit the types of violence that fall within self-defense, to assure that “the life of
every person, even that of an aggressor, should not be terminated if there is a less
extreme way to resolve the problem.”27 Nourse characterizes this as the “pacifist”
view of necessity, a moral principle demanding that the actor “avoid violence at all
costs.”28
While the pacifist approach to necessity may be compelling from a normative
perspective, it is not the only theory of necessity historically used to support the
doctrine of self-defense. As Nourse notes, if life preservation is the only value
served by self-defense, we should expect to see jurisdictions uniformly require
retreat before permitting the use of deadly force—a position at odds with current
law.29 In fact, under an equally compelling “libertarian” theory of self-defense, the
genesis of the doctrine is found instead in the right of each individual citizen to
take “self-help” measures in response to unlawful aggression.30 From this
25

See id. at 1259. Nourse found that battered women cases were more likely to invoke
imminence as a proxy for the actor’s alternatives to killing, as well as for each party’s “relative
responsibility” for the outcome. Id. at 1263, 1265.
26
Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 424
(1988) (emphasis added). The Model Penal Code adopts this approach explicitly, requiring that the
use of defensive force be “immediately necessary . . . on the present occasion.” MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04(1) (2002). Indeed, some have suggested completely replacing the concept of imminence with
that of necessity. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making
Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 279 (2002).
27
Dressler, supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis in original).
28
Nourse, supra note 8, at 1271.
29
Id. at 1272–73. See also DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 18.02[C], at 243–46 (noting that a
“slim majority” of jurisdictions require no retreat by non-aggressors before they respond with deadly
force, and that even jurisdictions with retreat rules generally recognize a “castle doctrine” exception
when the attack occurs in the actor’s dwelling).
30
Nourse, supra note 8, at 1274. Dressler has recognized the existence of competing and
inconsistent bases for justification defenses, including the principle of moral forfeiture. See
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alternative perspective, a battered woman who engages in self-help against her
abuser, when all other measures have failed, might have a strong justification claim
even under nonconfrontational circumstances.
Moreover, even a pacifist approach to necessity does not dictate that
imminence function as the predominant criterion. Other elements of the
doctrine—indeed, perhaps all of them—perform similarly life-affirming functions,
yet they have not been treated as sacrosanct. Again, the example of retreat is
instructive. In recent years, several jurisdictions that had required retreat before
the use of defensive force have loosened that requirement, at least at the margins,
by recognizing a “castle” exception in the defendant’s home or by revoking earlier
exceptions that required retreat in the home if the assailant was a co-dweller.31
Despite clearly expanding the universe of legally permissible deaths, such
marginal changes to retreat requirements have not been widely criticized as
rocking the foundations of the doctrine. In fact, although far more controversial,
several states recently have enacted so-called “shoot first” laws that permit the
preemptive use of deadly force against intruders and extend the castle exception to
virtually any location in which the defendant has a right to be present, thus
abolishing retreat in many public places as well.32 Far from reinforcing the
primacy of the pacifist approach, these efforts suggest that the libertarian basis for
self-defense may well be the predominant one today—at least where battered
women are not involved.
Furthermore, Dressler’s key factual assumption—that it is never reasonable
(or even credible) for a battered woman to believe a sleeping abuser presents an
imminent threat—is questionable. One of the conceptual problems with selfdefense is that it asks an unanswerable question: what would have happened had
the defendant not responded with deadly force? Dressler makes much of the fact
that until the moment of attack is upon her, the battered woman cannot be certain
of what will transpire—and the longer the gap between the active threat and her
deadly response, the less certain it is that she would have been killed by her abuser,
at least in the short term. As Dressler argues, “[t]o suggest that a battered woman
should be able to kill today because sooner or later the batterer will inevitably kill

DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 222–25. Although rejected by Dressler, this common law
principle would view the abuser as having forfeited his right to life due to his inhumane and unlawful
actions against his victim.
31
See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 245–46 (explaining castle doctrine); Weiand v. State,
732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999) (reversing prior Florida law by finding no duty to retreat from residence
before resorting to self-defense against co-occupant).
32
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2005) (permitting broad use of self-defense,
without retreat, in places where the defendant has a lawful right to be, and against persons who
unlawfully and forcibly enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle); Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand
Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at A1 (describing laws). Some defense
lawyers characterize this as an “SOB needed killing” defense. Tresa Baldes, ‘Shoot First’ Laws Hit
Courtrooms, NAT. L.J., July 3, 2006, at 25 (quotation omitted).
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her strikes me as unacceptable.”33 By focusing the inquiry on the battered
woman’s belief that her abuser is about to kill her, however, Dressler imposes a
legal requirement beyond what the doctrine demands. While it is true that selfdefense is appropriate only for one facing the unlawful exercise of “deadly force,”
it is important to remember that such force includes attacks likely to cause either
death or serious bodily harm.34 Rather than asking whether the battered woman
reasonably believes that she will be killed, then, the proper question is whether she
reasonably believes she will suffer serious bodily harm. Her reasonable belief in
imminent serious injury should be enough for her to be able to invoke self-defense,
even if she does not believe the attack is likely to take her life.
There is ample literature to suggest that a battered woman may in fact be
accurate in predicting an imminent threat of such harm from a sleeping abuser.
According to this literature, out of sheer instinctual self-preservation a battered
woman must become highly sensitive to her abuser’s behavior, and must learn to
read the cues of an impending attack. Moreover, it is not quite accurate to say that
a sleeping abuser poses no threat. Unless actually comatose, a sleeping abuser is
merely seconds away from being an awakened abuser—and research demonstrates
that abusers (particularly when intoxicated) tend to sleep lightly, demand that their
partners be present when they awaken, and resume the abuse immediately.35 Is it
truly unreasonable for a woman who has repeatedly experienced the violent
aftermath of her abuser’s naps to believe that the next severe attack is about to
begin?36
The wholesale refusal even to entertain the idea that the battered woman’s
assessment of the threat might be accurate is particularly striking in light of
evidence that the average person is not very good at predicting violence. As
Dressler notes elsewhere, research suggests that even trained mental health
professionals are apt to over-predict the future dangerousness of offenders, and the
rate of false positives for untrained laypersons could well be much higher.37 But
33

Dressler, supra note 1, at 467.
See LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 10.04 at 540–41.
35
By way of loose analogy, as parents of infants well know, a sleeping baby is merely
seconds away from being a screaming baby. Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to describe my
daughter’s afternoon nap as an “imminent meltdown”—one that my husband and I may be uniquely
qualified to predict.
36
See Walker, supra note 15, at 525 (describing hypervigilance and dangers posed when
abuser awakens). The facts of the Norman case fit this model: J.T. forced Judy Norman to lie on the
floor while he slept on the bed, and she left his side only to make sure her granddaughter’s crying
wouldn’t wake him. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).
37
Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: Reflections on
Maintaining Respect for Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY:
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259, 275 & n.84 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002). See
also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 110–17 (1984)
(describing studies); Jeremy Horder, Killing the Passive Abuser: A Theoretical Defence, in CRIMINAL
LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 283, 293 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds.,
2002) (discussing the “personal significance” of such predictions for battered women). Of course, it
34
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these statistics do not take into account the fact that the battered woman is not a
disinterested observer trying to assess her partner’s predilection for violence in the
abstract; she is simply trying, based on her own violent experiences, to predict
whether or not she is in danger of serious injury. Although a full discussion of the
social science evidence is beyond the scope of this Commentary, there may well be
good reason to suspect that the battered woman’s ability to predict this particular
danger is far better than that of the average person (or indeed the average juror).
At the very least, it should be clear that an irrebuttable presumption that her belief
is always wrong is no more defensible than a presumption that she is always
correct. In short, an analysis that asks the right question—whether this particular
battered woman had a reasonable belief that she faced the imminent use of force by
her abuser, capable of causing her serious bodily harm—may well come to a
different conclusion than Dressler assumes.
B. Objectivity
Of course, assessment of the battered woman’s belief in imminent harm is not
performed in the abstract. The vast majority of jurisdictions require not simply the
defendant’s good faith belief that the use of defensive force was necessary, but also
that an objectively reasonable person would have so believed. If the only person
who could accurately predict the impending violence is another battered woman—
or perhaps this battered woman, knowing all she does about this abuser—it would
appear to be impossible to satisfy an objective standard. Once again, however, the
battered woman who kills in nonconfrontational circumstances is not as far from
the norm as may first appear.
An ample literature documents that the model of the “reasonable person” has
never been quite as objective as its name suggests. In fact, the prevailing
definition is significantly more contextual than many, including Dressler, are
willing to credit. As Professor Kit Kinports notes, the reasonable person is neither
an ethical ideal nor the lowest statistical common denominator of what most
people would do under the circumstances. Instead, the concept is a normative
“measure of culpability” used to determine whether “conduct does not conform to
that which we can fairly demand of each other.”38 To assess self-defense, even the
most objective model of the reasonable person must incorporate some
characteristics of the situation, including the parties’ relative sizes, strength, age,
and physical disabilities, as well as prior acts or threats of violence.39 Rather than
does not take voluminous studies to tell most of us how bad we are at predicting violence: those of us
who have ever known someone who turned out, to our surprise, to be a spousal or child abuser are
familiar with the concept.
38
See Kinports, supra note 26, at 412–13.
39
See id. at 413–15 (discussing traditional admission of certain defendant traits under
objective standard); LAFAVE, supra note 11, at § 10.04(b), 542 (same). As Nourse notes, “[i]t is an
open secret that courts adopt a self-defense standard that is both objective and subjective; as a
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undercutting the validity of the standard, these rules merely recognize that the
reasonable person does not exist in a vacuum. In other words, the proverbial “man
on the Clapham omnibus” is asked to make his determination not from the safe
confines of his seat, but rather in the context of this altercation.40
In nonconfrontational cases, a key obstacle to meeting this standard is the fact
that evidence of the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior has been framed as
relevant only when viewed through the lens of BWS. Although useful in some
cases, BWS has proven to be extremely problematic as an empirical, cultural, and
political model. Indeed, it is not clear that BWS is in fact an accurate portrayal of
many (let alone most) abused women. As critics have noted, Dr. Walker’s
research consisted of interviews with a small group of racially homogeneous
battered women, and did not analyze differences between women who killed their
abusers and those who did not. From this, Walker generalized the three-stage
cycle of violence and learned helplessness theories—creating a model that is
culture-bound at best, and at worst may only reinforce stereotypes of female
submissiveness.41
In fact, many argue that the entire premise of BWS is fatally flawed: we
neither can nor should try to identify a single model of “the battered woman.”
Women are abused across the spectrum of race, cultural, and financial status.
Some are financially dependent on their abusers; some are financially independent
job-holders; others, such as Judy Norman, are forced to support their abusers by
engaging in degrading and illegal activities. Limiting expert testimony to women
who fit an unrealistic model invites convictions on the basis that a defendant
simply wasn’t a “good” battered woman—a particular risk in homicide cases, as
the act of killing seems inconsistent with claims of helplessness.42
doctrinal matter, then, there simply is no debate, except at the margins.” Nourse, supra note 8, at
1295; see also Burke, supra note 26, at 287–88, 291 (noting falsity of objective-subjective dichotomy
and arguing in favor of a “contextualized” standard).
40
Indeed, it sometimes appears that the objectively reasonable person is being conflated with
the “reasonable bystander,” another concept used to illustrate these ideas. The idea of a third party
such as a policeman, who comes upon the altercation and must make a decision as to which party to
aid, is a powerful one used to illustrate the limits of justification defenses. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler,
New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s
Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 95–98 (1984) (analyzing third party’s right to
intervene as derivative of the actor’s own justification). Unlike the bystander, however, the
reasonable person need not be unfamiliar with the facts of the situation.
41
For particularly salient criticism of the BWS model, see, e.g., Mary Becker, Access to
Justice for Battered Women, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 68–72 (2003) (describing more recent
research); Burke, supra note 26, at 232–47 (extensively criticizing BWS as applied to self-defense);
Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 70–87 (1994) (criticizing Walker’s
“patriarchal” research); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 529–35 (1992)
(criticizing “essentialism” of narrow definitions of battered women).
42
See Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered
Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 173–77 (2004) (noting that an “active
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Moreover, the vision offered by BWS is one of dysfunction. Much of the
problem may be due to the characterization of BWS as a “syndrome.” The
invocation of a medical-psychological model may have hastened the acceptance of
BWS expert testimony by judges, but it did so at the expense of women’s
rationality: trapped by the cycle of violence, the BWS victim mistakenly believes
that she is helpless to change her situation and thus fails to comprehend viable
alternatives that would be obvious to the average person. While advocates argue
that the syndrome functions merely as a short-hand mechanism to convey general
characteristics to a judge or jury, critics charge that it instead “defines the woman
as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, and behavioral
abnormalities . . . [who] lack[s] the psychological capacity to choose lawful means
to extricate themselves from abusive mates.”43 Viewed in this light, the woman
suffering from BWS is, by definition, most assuredly not acting as a reasonable
person. Where BWS exculpates, then, it does so only by playing on our sympathy
for the battered woman’s situation—and as Dressler makes clear, compassion is
not an adequate basis for justification.44
In part, the difficulty may lie in conflating BWS with the battered woman, in
confusing an analytical construct with the reality of an individual woman’s life. If
the objectively reasonable person is inherently (albeit marginally) contextual,
rather than purely abstract, the task facing the battered woman who kills under
nonconfrontational circumstances should be simply to convince the jury that she
acted as a normal person would in this extreme situation. As Professor Alafair
Burke argues, battered women are “rational actors choosing among options that are
limited by their factual circumstances.”45 Factors that might be relevant to how a
reasonable person would react to repeated abuse, for example, include: the extent
of prior violence; threats of impending violence that give credence to the battered
woman’s perception of imminent serious harm; prior unsuccessful attempts to seek
assistance from family, friends, law enforcement, and government agencies;
whether the defendant has a job or other financial resources; whether the defendant
has children and, if so, any means to care for them; and whether the defendant has
a safe place to go. Far from being specific to battered women, however, this basic
information is relevant to “how ordinary people . . . tend to think and act in a
certain kind of exceptional situation.”46
None of these factors will be
survivor” theory offers a better explanation of why a battered woman is able to overcome her
helplessness and kill her abuser).
43
Coughlin, supra note 41, at 7.
44
Dressler, supra note 1, at 464–66. Moreover, as a practical matter, relying on BWS
testimony to defend against a homicide prosecution may have collateral disadvantages, particularly in
custody decisions. See Schneider, supra note 41, at 556–57 (explaining how BWS evidence can be
used to support a finding that a woman is incapable of caring for her children).
45
Burke, supra note 26, at 266.
46
Horder, supra note 37, at 295. See also Burke, supra note 26, at 266 (describing potentially
relevant information); Nourse, supra note 8, at 1291 (urging that we rethink BWS “as a set of
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determinative, and each juror may weigh them differently. But the key is to
understand that this is the type of information that jurors frequently consider in
assessing a defendant’s actions and mental state. If this information is framed as
traditionally admissible evidence about the circumstances of, and parties to, a
crime, rather than special considerations that are relevant only when viewed in
light of BWS, the objective-subjective debate loses much of its force. Battered
women, it turns out, may be no more than average people facing horrific
circumstances the rest of us pray we never encounter.
IV. DURESS AND THE ROLE OF THE JURY
Having rejected any possibility that a battered woman who kills in
nonconfrontational circumstances might be acting as an objectively reasonable
person would in a similar situation, Dressler offers a different solution to the
problem based on the excuse of duress. In Dressler’s view, what is needed is a
way to explain that women like Judy Norman lack the “fair opportunity” to
conform their actions to the law. Dressler proposes that this be accomplished
through statutes similar to the MPC’s duress defense, which applies:
if a person is coerced to commit a crime—including murder—as the
result of prior use of unlawful force upon the person . . . and/or imminent
or non-imminent threats by the aggressor to use unlawful force upon the
person in the future, if a person of reasonable firmness in the actor’s
situation would have been unable to resist committing the crime.47
Because defendants will be measured against the “person of reasonable firmness”
rather than a helpless woman suffering from BWS, Dressler believes the jury
should be able to apply its own normative standards, without the need for expert
psychological testimony.48
Dressler’s proposal offers many advantages over the current approach.
Characterizing the battered woman’s claim as one based on a lack of fair
opportunity allows us to reaffirm her rationality while still expressing our dismay
at the resulting loss of life. By focusing on an external impediment to her free
choice (i.e., the abuser), rather than the internalized dysfunction of learned
helplessness, duress allows us to excuse the battered woman’s actions without
“pathologizing” her perceptions.
Moreover, the doctrine permits us to
acknowledge that society as a whole plays a role in denying battered women fair
opportunities by failing to provide the law enforcement services, shelters, and
relatively innocuous and perhaps necessary normative propositions”). Dressler agrees that these
questions are appropriate, but only in the context of an excuse. See Dressler, supra note 1, at 470.
47
Dressler, supra note 1, at 470 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09).
48
Id. at 470.
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financial assistance needed to enable victims to escape their situations.49 A duress
defense would force society to take responsibility for allowing the situation to
escalate, and perhaps thereby spur the development of improved assistance
programs.
Despite these advantages, however, Dressler’s proposal suffers from serious
flaws. The most obvious problem, as Dressler admits, is that such a defense is not
recognized under current law. Few jurisdictions have followed the MPC: duress
generally is limited to situations in which an innocent party is coerced into
committing a crime against a third party, rather than striking back against the
coercer, and the defense cannot be invoked for homicides. Thus, without
significant alteration, it is unlikely that current duress law would assist a battered
woman charged with killing her abuser.50
A deeper problem, however, is that relying on duress might not avoid many of
the problems raised by BWS. As Dressler has conceded elsewhere, the basic
concept of an “excuse” is somewhat pejorative in nature.51 Moreover, duress is
unusual even within the universe of legal excuses. Unlike a paradigmatic excuse
such as insanity, where the defendant loses her ability to appreciate and/or control
her conduct, the defendant who acts under duress unequivocally retains the ability
to choose her course of action—and she chooses incorrectly, albeit for
understandable reasons.52 Indeed, in his earlier writings Dressler criticized the
drafters of the MPC for treating duress essentially as an incapacity defense, similar
to insanity, by requiring that a person of reasonable firmness be incapable of
resisting the coercion.53 Given this inconsistent pedigree, it is not clear that a

49
See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing,
and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89,
102–06 (1999) (offering examples of systemic state failures to intervene in battering relationships).
Because it does not rely on the battered woman’s “sickness,” but rather views her as “a person of
reasonable firmness,” duress might also counteract some of the negative repercussions for battered
women in custody disputes. See supra note 44, and accompanying text.
50
Dressler, supra note 1, at 470–71 & n.31. One response to this problem, of course, is to ask
that attorneys advocate for changes to current law that would make this defense feasible, similar to
successful efforts to admit BWS testimony. Id. at 471 n.33. But asking advocates to abandon current
strategy for an untried theory—all to appease law professors—is unlikely to be a winning argument.
Moreover, to the extent that even traditional duress cases have thus far been less hospitable to BWS
testimony than self-defense cases, this might be a difficult battle. See Burke, supra note 26, at 247–
66 (noting unsuccessful attempts to invoke BWS in duress cases, despite the better factual fit).
51
See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses
and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 672 (1988) (noting that excuse “says something
less complimentary about the wrongdoer or, in some cases, about humanity in general”). See also
Coughlin, supra note 41, at 14–15 (describing “disabilities” that give rise to excuse).
52
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1360, 1365 (1989) (noting the unusual normative basis for
duress).
53
Dressler, supra note 51, at 708–10.
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reconstructed duress defense would avoid implicating concepts of female
incapacity and irrationality.
Moreover, I remain unconvinced that jurors, left to their own devices, can
adequately assess such evidence. Because “reasonable firmness” functions as a
normative standard, Dressler believes jurors will be able to make this assessment
merely as laypersons: how much moral firmness could we truly expect of someone
in this extreme situation?54 As an initial matter, we must ask whether the “person
of reasonable firmness” who acts under duress is significantly different from the
“reasonable person” acting in self-defense. Indeed, it is unclear exactly what
“reasonable firmness” means under the MPC. To the extent the jury is asked to
compare the battered woman’s actions to those of a hypothetical “person of
reasonable firmness,” this suggests an objective standard. The normative aspects
of the defense, however, invite jurors to apply a gut-level sense of what they might
do in a similar situation—suggesting the standard requires nothing more than a
subjective “there but for the grace of God go I” assessment.55 Moreover, to the
extent the traditional reasonable person in self-defense is not as abstractly
objective as would first appear, the gap between these standards narrows
considerably. Jurors have always made assessments of reasonableness based on
what they, personally, believe—that is, after all, the basis of using reasonable
laypersons as fact-finders. To expect jurors to reach vastly different results under
an even more nebulous approach to reasonableness may simply be asking too
much.
Even if defined with precision, the “person of reasonable firmness” standard
will not necessarily focus the jurors on the issues most relevant to assessing the
battered woman’s culpability. To put it bluntly, if judges and jurors inherently
were able to understand the exigencies of these situations, advocates would never
have needed to introduce evidence of BWS in the first place. Indeed, the fact that
the majority of failed self-defense claims by battered women involve killings that
occur during traditional confrontations, rather than under nonconfrontational
circumstances, suggests how difficult it is to move beyond longstanding
assumptions about gender roles in violent relationships. As Professor Nourse
notes, “[b]attered woman cases are in general not seen as ‘real fights’ . . . . [and]
courts and commentators have trouble seeing confrontational cases as
confrontational because of their normative assumptions about what the parties’
54

Dressler, supra note 52, at 1345.
As Professor Markus Dubber notes, “Just what reasonable firmness is, and whether I
displayed whatever it is, would be left up to the jury, the general receptacle of reasonableness in
American criminal law.” MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 257 (2002).
Dressler suggests that most jurors would view themselves as surpassing the reasonable firmness
standard, believing they would not have made the same choice as the defendant (although they would
have understood the all-too-human temptation). Interestingly, one of my colleagues had the opposite
reaction: she believed the standard refers to a person who is morally much stronger than most people,
including most jurors, would believe themselves to be. This suggests that the definitional problem
would need to be resolved before the standard would be viable in a courtroom.
55
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relationship entails.”56 For that reason alone, a standard that enshrines those
assumptions anew should be avoided.
For a battered woman who kills her abuser, the most problematic assumption
involves the question of why she remained in the abusive relationship. In other
words, why didn’t she leave—if not years earlier, at least before the violence
escalated? Yet even in jurisdictions that require retreat prior to the use of deadly
force, retreat only becomes necessary once a confrontation arises. There is no
general duty under self-defense law to avoid altercations by “pre-retreating” from
situations where violence may occur, whether the defendant is a woman who fears
abuse or a shop-owner who runs a business in a dangerous neighborhood. But as
Nourse’s research demonstrates, it has been extremely difficult to disabuse judges
and jurors of this notion.57
Rather than resolving the issue, it appears that a duress defense would accord
this inquiry an even more central role. Applying the no-fair-opportunity standard
to the Norman facts, Dressler notes that the central question for the jury would be
whether Judy Norman could “have avoided the situation by walking out the
door.”58 To answer that, the jurors would have to ask themselves additional
questions about her options, including what would have become of the Normans’
children had she left (unclear), where she would have gone (also unclear, because
J.T. had terrorized her extended family), how she would have supported herself
(other than as a prostitute, we assume), whether J.T. would nonetheless have found
her (as he had on previous occasions), and whether she could have turned to the
police for assistance (which she did, to no avail, several times in the days before
the killing)—questions that even Dressler admits might well weigh in her favor.
The problem is that all of these questions are ones that advocates for battered
women have been trying to get judges and juries to ask for years, a quest that was
successful only with the introduction of expert testimony about BWS. In fact, the
much-maligned theory of learned helplessness is only one explanation for why a
woman doesn’t leave. Advocates have also documented the failure of law
enforcement to offer assistance, the lack of shelters to house battered women who
flee their homes (especially those with young children), and the lack of economic
opportunities and legal assistance for women once they do leave.59 Moreover,
sociological research makes clear that leaving is often not a safe option. The
woman’s attempt to break free from the relationship often spurs the abuser to
escalate the level of violence, sometimes fatally—a documented phenomenon
known as “separation assault.”60 In short, there is abundant evidence of very good
56

Nourse, supra note 8, at 1286.
Id. at 1284 (discussing how imminence can be used as a proxy to require a woman to “preretreat” from the relationship).
58
Dressler, supra note 1, at 470.
59
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 73–83 (explaining challenges).
60
See Burke, supra note 26, at 267–73 (noting dangers and explaining why the choice to stay
may be a rational one); DIANE CRAVEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SPECIAL
57
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reasons—physical, financial, and psychological—why battered women remain in
these relationships. Yet the mere fact that the question is still asked suggests that
the results of this research are not intuitive. And the only way this information has
been successfully conveyed to judges and juries has been through the use of expert
testimony, which Dressler’s proposal would disallow.
By refusing to permit expert testimony about the context of the battering—not
necessarily in the guise of BWS, but at least from someone with professional
expertise—I fear we simply will invite jurors to rely on their inaccurate
assumptions about battered women defendants. Perhaps the problem is that any
attempt to define a defense that fits all battered women can be criticized as falling
into the trap of essentialism. BWS certainly does so, recasting the woman’s
identity as merely the sum of the abuse perpetrated upon her. By denying battered
women rationality while seeking ways to absolve them of liability, however,
Dressler’s proposal does much the same: it continues to conflate “the battered
woman” as a theoretical construct with the facts of an individual case. I believe
the best way to resolve this disagreement is not to create new syndromes or
defenses, but simply to let those facts speak for themselves.
V. CONCLUSION
I share Professor Dressler’s concerns regarding the coarsening of our moral
values regarding human life, and his reluctance to embrace ever-expanding
concepts of self-defense. But I differ in how much of the blame I am willing to
assign to battered women for the current state of affairs. The problems raised by
nonconfrontational killings are not unique to battered women, but in truth are
inherent in our fragmented approach to the use of deadly defensive force. The
doctrine’s disparate and conflicting philosophical underpinnings—ranging from
pacifist to libertarian to moral forfeiture—suggest that no moral imperative
commands the battered woman to risk life and limb to give her abuser the ultimate
benefit of the doubt. It is one thing for us to hope, as a moral matter, that a
battered woman will turn the other cheek. For the law to require her to do so—
literally upon pain of death—is quite another matter indeed.
Finally, I confess that the legal academy’s fascination with homicides by
battered women has always been something of a mystery to me. Despite the
prevalence (or recalcitrance) of domestic violence, the vast majority of battered
women do not kill their abusers, and very few do so in nonconfrontational
circumstances.61 Dressler suggests that these numbers may be higher, and perhaps
REPORT: SEX DIFFERENCES IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1994, 4 (Sept. 1997) (noting “dramatically
elevated” rate of violence against separated women).
61
Nor does it appear that the number of such killings is increasing—not even in Texas, where
the late Ann Richards once quipped that “the price of gasoline has gotten so high that Texas women
who want to run over their husbands have to carpool.” Molly Ivins, Bucking the Texas Lockstep,
WASH. POST, May 15, 2003, at A29.
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he is right. But if we believe these statistics to be underinclusive, we similarly
might question recent estimates of the numbers of women who are killed by their
partners. According to the Department of Justice, wives constituted an astounding
81% of all persons killed by their spouses in 2002, and girlfriends were 71% of all
victims killed by a boyfriend or girlfriend.62 I do not mean to make light of the
moral dangers of a criminal justice system that compassionately but incorrectly
allows battered women to cloak vengeance in the guise of self-defense. But the
fact that wives and girlfriends are killed by their husbands and boyfriends at a rate
of roughly four to one—despite years of efforts to eradicate domestic violence—
suggests to me a far greater problem with the moral state of the criminal law.

62

MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE
OF JUST. PROGRAMS, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND
ACQUAINTANCES 18 (June 2005). These numbers may well be low, as the relationship between
victim and killer was ascertained in only 9,102 of the 16,204 non-negligent homicides that year.

